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UNFAIR PRACTICES AND PRACTICING
ATTORNEYS: SHOULD THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
APPLY TO COMMUNICATIONS




Consider the following scenario: Jane Goodman purchased
her dream home in 1981.' For nearly thirty years she made all of
her mortgage payments on time. Due to the recent economic
downturn, Jane found herself unable to make the last remaining
payments. Instead of bringing a foreclosure action, the bank sold
Jane's debt to a debt collection agency. Afraid of losing her home,
Jane sought the help of an attorney, who sent a letter to the debt
collection agency requesting a statement of the outstanding loan
balance. The agency responded to Jane's attorney incorrectly
claiming that Jane's outstanding balance was double what Jane
believed she owed. Jane's attorney promptly sent a letter to the
agency disputing the amount owed, but the agency did not cease
its collection efforts. Both the balance misstatement and the
agency's continued collection efforts violate the plain meaning of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "FDCPA" or "Act"),
which regulates the conduct of debt collectors.2 The question
I Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's University
School of Law; B.S., 2009, Hunter College, City University of New York. This Note is
dedicated to Avi, who always insisted that I could, even when I argued I couldn't.
And to my mother, who taught me more than any classroom ever could. A special
thank you to Professor Jeff Sovern for his guidance and support.
1 This introductory hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Allen ex rel.
Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1141 (2012).
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
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remains, however, whether the Act imposes liability for the
agency's violative conduct when its actions were directed at
Jane's attorney rather than Jane herself.
Certainly the issue is an important one. The debt collection
industry is continuing to grow and abusive debt collection
practices remain a very serious problem.' The Federal Reserve
reported that as of October 2011, consumer debt reached $2.457
trillion, up from $2.408 trillion in the prior year.4 With the rise
of consumer debt and the uncertainty of the markets, reports
have surfaced that "[dlebt collectors are getting desperate and
dirty."' According to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the
primary administrative body responsible for enforcing the Act,
"[it] receives more complaints about the debt collection industry
than any other specific industry."6  In 2010, the FTC received
over 108,000 complaints, known as "FDCPA complaints," against
third-party debt collectors. That number represents an overall
increase from the year before and about twenty-one percent of all
complaints received by the FTC in 2010.8 The increase in
consumer debt and the abusive collection practices resulting
thereof demonstrate why now, more than ever, it is imperative
that debtors and their attorneys be made aware of exactly what
abuses the Act does and does not protect against.
Currently, those circuits that have addressed whether
certain communications directed solely at a debtor's attorney can
be actionable under the FDCPA have taken three very different
approaches. Under the first approach, courts reason that
communications that violate the Act when directed at the debtor
are not actionable when directed at the debtor's attorney because
the Act does not provide protection to attorneys.9 Under the
3 See Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
3107, 3109-10 (2010).
FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: CONSUMER CREDIT (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/20111207/gl9.pdf.
6 Blake Ellis, Debt Collectors Get Nasty, CNN MONEY (July 10, 2010, 3:25 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/09/news/economy/debt-collectionharassment/index.
htm.
6 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT 4 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110321fairdebt
collectreport.pdf.
7 Id. at 5.
6 See id.
* See infra Part III.A.
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second approach, communications from a debt collector to a
debtor's attorney regarding the consumer debt are considered
indirect communications with the debtor himself and therefore
result in liability when violations of the Act occur.o Finally,
under the third approach, a debt collector's deceptive
communications to an attorney may violate the Act if the
representation would deceive or mislead a "competent
attorney.""
This Note contends that the question of whether a
communication by a debt collector directed solely at a debtor's
attorney is subject to the Act must be resolved consistently with
the Act's underlying purposes. If Congress's purpose would be
served by subjecting those communications to liability, then the
conduct should be actionable. If, on the other hand, Congress's
intent would not be furthered by making those communications
actionable, then the Act's liability should not be imposed.
Determining whether a debt collector's conduct is subject to
liability depends upon the section of the Act that was violated.
If, for example, a section's purpose is to protect a consumer
because of his lack of commercial sophistication, treating an
attorney in a similar manner as an ordinary consumer seemingly
would not serve Congress's intent. Alternatively, if a section
exemplifies Congress's attempt to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices generally, it suggests that Congress intended
to prohibit the abusive practice regardless of the receiver, and it
would serve that intent to impose liability for violations directed
at attorneys. Therefore, a detailed discussion of Congress's
intent in enacting the Act is necessary.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the
history of the Act and Congress's intent behind its enactment.
Part I also analyzes some of the Act's provisions relating to debt
collectors. Part II examines in detail the three current
approaches taken by the circuit courts for determining the
applicability of the Act to communications between debt
collectors and debtors' attorneys. Part III argues that none of the
current approaches appropriately resolves the issue.
Additionally, Part III proposes a simple two-step inquiry for
courts to employ when attempting to resolve whether
1o See infra Part III.B.
n See infra Part III.C.
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communications toward a debtor's attorney are actionable under
the Act. Part III concludes by demonstrating how this two-step
inquiry properly balances Congress's intent to protect consumers
without placing too heavy a burden on legitimate debt collection.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Congress's enactment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act came after a long history of abusive and harassing debt
collection practices.12 Consumers found themselves subject to
"obscene or profane language, threats of violence, telephone calls
at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer's legal
rights, disclosing a consumer's personal affairs to friends,
neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a
consumer through false pretense, impersonating public officials
and attorneys, and simulating legal process."13 Congress found
that those abusive practices "contribute[d] to the number of
personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs,
and to invasions of individual privacy." 4 Prior to the enactment
of the FDCPA, consumers had little legal recourse on which they
could rely.'5  Plaintiffs attempting to sue a debt collector under
common law tort theories had difficulty winning their cases. 6
And even when the consumer was victorious, the American rule,
which provides that each side must pay his or her own attorney's
fees, prevented the consumer from obtaining a net award."
12 See generally S. REP. No. 95-382 (1977); see also William P. Hoffman,
Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIs U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2010).
13 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1696.
14 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012).
15 Scott J. Burnham, What Attorneys Should Know About the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, or, the 2 Do's and 200 Don'ts of Debt Collection, 59 MONT. L.
REV. 179, 181-83 (1998) ("Common law tort claims against debt collectors have
included invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel and
slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and assault
and battery.").
16 Id. at 181; see, e.g., Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1976). In
Davis, the court applied the legal standard for intentional infliction of emotional
distress but did not find that the debt collector's conduct was "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency"
as the Restatement (Second) of Torts required. Davis, 360 N.E.2d at 767 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
" Burnham, supra note 15, at 181.
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Congress, however, did not wish for the Act to be misused by
debtors in an effort to evade payment of their debts. Instead,
Congress sought to strike a balance between protecting
consumers from abusive debt collection practices and allowing
legitimate debt collection efforts.'" While aware that the debt
collection industry was a "substantial business"" unable to afford
disruption by needless legislation, Congress nonetheless
concluded that "the suffering and anguish [that unscrupulous
debt collectors] regularly inflict[ed] [was] substantial""o enough to
warrant FDCPA legislation.
Congress focused on independent debt collection agencies,
which it found were more likely to engage in abusive practices
because, unlike creditors, third-party debt collectors were less
concerned with their reputation among consumers." Instead, the
fifty-percent commission that collection agencies generally
receive provides even more of an incentive to aggressively collect
the debts, using any means necessary.22 Congress highlighted
that most debtors were not "deadbeats,"" as the debt collectors
asserted, but rather individuals unable to repay their debts due
to circumstances beyond their control.2 4 Representative Frank
Annunzio, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
1I Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearing on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and
H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr.) ("My goal-and I believe the goal of this subcommittee-
is to report legislation which protects consumers from collection abuses and at the
same time permits the honest collectors to continue to do their job effectively."); see
also Elwin Griffith, The Challenge of Communicating with the Consumer and
Validating the Debt Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
61, 62 (2006).
19 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1696 (1977).
20 Id.
21 Id. ("Unlike creditors, who generally are restrained by the desire to protect
their good will when collecting past due accounts, independent collectors are likely
to have no future contact with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the
consumer's opinion of them.").
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1697 ("One of the most frequent fallacies concerning debt collection
legislation is the contention that the primary beneficiaries are 'deadbeats.' [sic] In
fact, however, there is universal agreement among scholars, law enforcement
officials, and even debt collectors that the number of persons who willfully refuse to
pay just debts is miniscule.").
24 Id. The senate report pointed out that "[wihen default occurs, it is nearly
always due to an unforeseen event such as unemployment, overextension, serious
illness, or marital difficulties or divorce." Id.
2013] 1111
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declared that "[t]he goal of [the Act] is to stop unethical debt
collectors from using abusive tactics. In essence, what this
means is that every individual, whether or not he owes a debt,
has the right to be treated in a reasonable and civil manner. "25
While the primary reason for the FDCPA's enactment was to
protect consumers from abusive practices, Congress had other
concerns as well. Congress noted that debt collectors engaging in
abusive practices had an unfair competitive advantage over those
not willing to engage in such behavior." Congress further found
that abuses were so widespread because there was a "lack of
meaningful legislation on the State level."2 7 Accordingly, the Act
begins by declaring that its purpose is "to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices
are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.""
B. Relevant Provisions of the Act
The FDCPA regulates the conduct of debt collectors. Various
sections of the Act proscribe a debt collector's use of harassing or
abusive practices, false or misleading representations," unfair
practices,3 ' and furnishing certain deceptive forms. 2 In one of
the statute's early sections and reinforced in a later section, the
Act declares that once a debt collector33 becomes aware that a
debtor is being represented by an attorney with regard to the
debt, "or can readily ascertain" such information, the debt
21 123 Cong. Rec. 10,241 (1977) (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
27 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1696. In 1977, the time of the senate report, "nearly 40
percent of [the] population [had] no meaningful protection from debt collection
abuse." Id. at 1697.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
29 Id. § 1692d.
20 Id. § 1692e.
21 Id. § 1692f.
32 Id. § 1692j.
3 Debt collector is defined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is
the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012); see also Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226,
230 (4th Cir. 2007).
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collector may "not communicate with any person other than that
attorney [regarding the debt]."" Further, communication about
the debt with a third party other than the "consumer, his
attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by
law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of
the debt collector" is prohibited."
In addition to protecting a consumer against harassing or
abusive practices," a debt collector may not use "any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection
with the collection of any debt."3 ' A non-exhaustive list provided
in the Act illustrates the type of conduct that would constitute a
violation, which, the Act emphasizes, does not limit the section's
general applicability. Included in that list of violations, for
example, is a debt collector's false representation of the amount
or character of any debt 39 or threats of legal action that cannot or
is not intended to be taken.40
The Act also imposes on debt collectors the requirement to
furnish certain information upon initial communication with a
debtor.4 ' After notifying a consumer of his outstanding debt, the
debt collector must provide the consumer with written notice of
the outstanding balance of the debt, the name of the creditor,
that the debt will be deemed valid unless it is disputed within
thirty days, and, if requested, that the debt collector will provide
the consumer with the original creditor's information if it is
different from the current creditor. 42 The Act states that
[i]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the
thirty-day period .. . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is
disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt,
or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains
verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment ....
34 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(6) (2012); see also id. § 1692c(a)(2). The Act makes an
exception for an attorney who "fails to respond within a reasonable period of
time... ." Id.
* Id. § 1692c(b).
36 See id. § 1692d.
3 Id. § 1692e.
38 See id.
3 Id. § 1692e(2)(A).
40 Id. § 1692e(5).
41 See id. § 1692g(a).
4 Id.
I Id. § 1692g(b).
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And, "[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in
a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for
purposes of [the Act].""
If a debt collector violates any provision of the FDCPA, the
Act subjects the debt collector to civil liability.45 The Act provides
that "any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of
th[e Act] with respect to any person is liable to such person in an
amount ... [of] any actual damage sustained by such person as a
result of such failure."4 ' Although the statute has been described
as "strict liability" in nature,47 it does provide an exception for
those debt collectors that can show "by a preponderance of
evidence" that the violation was unintentional "and resulted from
a bona fide error."48 This bona fide error exception balances the
interest of legitimate debt collectors and consumers who need
protection from debt collection abuse by ensuring that the burden
placed on the debt collection industry is not too heavy, punishing
only those representations that are intentionally meant to take
advantage of the consumer.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Currently, there exists a tripartite circuit split among those
circuits that have considered whether certain communications
from a debt collector to a debtor's attorney are actionable under
the FDCPA.49 The Ninth Circuit held that communications that
violate the Act when sent by a debt collector to a debtor's
attorney, absent threats to communicate with the debtor directly,
" Id. § 1692g(d).
45 See id. § 1692k(a).
46 Id. § 1692k(a)(1). The Act also permits a court to impose additional damages,
but not to exceed $1,000, along with reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. § 1692(a)(2)(A),
(a)(3). For more on recovery under the Act, see generally Jeremy Gogel, Remedies
(and Lack Thereofl) for Victims of Abusive Debt Collection Practices, 66 J. Mo. B. 330
(2010).
4 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.
2011) (citing McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939,
948 (9th Cir. 2011)).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
4 For purposes of this discussion, this Note will presume that all
communications in dispute would violate the Act had they been directed at the
debtor. Thus, the central issue in the cases discussed herein was whether such
violative communications were actionable such that they were subject to the Act's
liability, when, instead of being directed toward the debtor, they were sent to the
debtor's attorneys.
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are not subject to FDCPA liability. 0 The Fourth Circuit, recently
joined by the Third Circuit, has taken the opposite view,
declaring that communication to a debtor's attorney qualifies as
indirect communication to the debtor himself, making it
unquestionably subject to the Act.5 1 Refusing to accept either of
the existing bright-line approaches, the Seventh Circuit created a
hybrid analysis. That approach recognizes that in some, but not
all, circumstances, communications from a debt collector to a
debtor's attorney will be actionable under the Act.52
A. Communications to a Debtor's Attorney Are Not Actionable
1. The Ninth Circuit: Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC
In Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC,5 3 the Ninth Circuit
held that a debt collector's communication to a debtor's attorney
prior to validating a disputed debt was not actionable under the
Act.54 In that case, debtor Guerrero hired an attorney after a
debt collector, RJM, sent notices of his outstanding debt to each
of his listed addresses. 5 Guerrero's attorney sent RJM
notification that Guerrero was represented by counsel. 6 The
attorney's letter also disputed the amount owed and asserted
that RJM's initial letters violated the Act. RJM responded to
Guerrero's attorney and explained that it had acquired
Guerrero's debt from Citibank.8 Included in RJM's response was
a copy of a letter from Citibank to Guerrero confirming RJM as
the new owner of the debt.'9 RJM made no further attempt to
'o See generally Guerrero v. RJM Acquisition LLC, 499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007).
s1 See generally Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2007); see
also Allen v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct
1141 (2012).
52 See generally Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th
Cir. 2007).
53 499 F.3d 926.
5 Id. at 929; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012).
5 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 930. The two letters were sent to the two different
addresses the debtor provided the original creditor and contained identical
information except that the account numbers differed by one character. Id. Guerrero
claimed that a debtor could have been led to believe that these letters were attempts
to collect two different debts. Id. at 934.
' Id. at 930.
5' Id.
I Id. at 931.
59 Id.
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communicate with Guerrero or his attorney.60 Guerrero filed a
complaint in district court alleging violations of the Act.
Specifically, Guerrero alleged that RJM's response to his
attorney violated section 1692g(b) of the Act, which requires that
a debt collector "cease collection of the debt" until a disputed debt
has been confirmed. After extensive briefing by both sides,
judgment was entered in Guerrero's favor.63  The district court
found that RJM violated the Act by responding to Guerrero's
attorney prior to verifying the debt."4
RJM appealed to the Ninth Circuit and urged the court to
adopt the view that "communications that violate the Act when
directed at a consumer do not violate the Act when directed at a
consumer's legal counsel."6  The court agreed and reversed the
district court's ruling, finding that "the Act's purpose is to protect
unsophisticated debtors from abusive debt collectors, and once a
consumer obtains this protection by procuring legal counsel, the
Act's protections become superfluous and therefore its provisions
no longer apply."6 6
The Ninth Circuit's bright-line approach primarily rests on
the idea that "[a] consumer and his attorney are not one and the
same for purposes of the Act."6  In Guerrero, the court supported
its holding by pointing to several different provisions in the Act
60 Id. at 932.
61 Id. The complaint alleged violations of the Act with regard to the original
letters RJM sent to Guerrero that notified him of the debt and RJM's letter
responding to Guerrero's attorney. Id. at 933-34. For purposes of simplicity, this
Note will only discuss the latter.
62 Id. at 936; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2006).
" Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 932. The district court granted in part and denied in
part both parties' summary judgment motions. Id. Specifically, the district court
concluded that RJM's letter to Guerrero's attorney "was an express 'attempt to
collect a debt' following [RJM's] receipt of [Guerrero's] verification request," and
therefore violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g of the Act. Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC,
No. 03-00038 HG-LEK, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15416, at *30 (D. Haw. July 9, 2004).
Later, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation to grant
Guerrero's motion for attorneys' fees. Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 932.
64 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 929. The district court also found that RJM violated the
Act with regard to the two collection letters containing slightly different account
numbers because the court determined that the least sophisticated consumer-the
standard of review for FDCPA actions in the Ninth Circuit-would likely have been
misled. See id. at 933-34.
65 Id. at 929.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 935.
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that refer both to a consumer and his attorney.68 Those
provisions, the court asserted, suggest that under the statute a
debtor and his attorney should be treated not as one, but rather
two "legally distinct entities."69 Additionally, the court noted that
"attorney" was not included in the Act's extensive list of
individuals defined as a "consumer."70 The court concluded that
together these provisions demonstrate that the Act applies
differently to debtors and their attorneys and maintained that
this reading of the statute is in line with Congress's intent when
it passed the FDCPA.n' According to the court, because attorneys
are not easily susceptible to the manipulative practices of debt
collectors-a concern Congress had for unsophisticated debtors
when enacting the statute-it is unnecessary to extend the Act's
protections beyond those unsophisticated debtors.7 2 The court
applied its reading of the statute, together with its interpretation
of Congress's intent, to hold that "a collection effort must be
aimed directly to the consumer himself to be prohibited."73 The
court added in dicta that any communications directed toward a
debtor's attorney would not be actionable, regardless of the
provision it violated.74
6 See id. The court referred to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), which requires that a
debt collector communicate solely with a debtor's attorney once the debt collector is
aware that one has been procured. Id. Later in that section, the statute proscribes
communication with a third party regarding the debt except "the consumer, his
attorney, a consumer reporting agency .. . the creditor, [or] the attorney of the
creditor...." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2012). The court also highlighted that in the
statute's long list of individuals under the defined "consumer" umbrella, "attorney"
is notably absent. Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d)).
6 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935.
70 Id.
n1 Id.
72 Id. ("Unsophisticated consumers are easily bullied and misled. Trained
attorneys are not."). The court did, however, distinguish between an attorney
representing a debtor and a debtor who happened to be an attorney. Id. at 936 n.4.
Nonetheless, the court did not discuss what differences, if any, it would make in the
analysis if a communication was sent to a debtor who happened to also be a licensed
attorney. See id.
7 Id. at 936.
74 Id. at 936, 939 ("[Wlhen the debt collector ceases contact with the debtor, and
instead communicates exclusively with an attorney hired to represent the debtor in




In his dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that the majority's
holding would circumvent the protective purposes of the
FDCPA." He began by criticizing the majority's broad dicta,
which stated that a violation of the Act-whenever directed
toward a debtor's attorney-would never be subject to liability.
According to Fletcher, given the statute's structure, which first
requires a debt collector to communicate solely with a debtor's
attorney once one has been procured and later proscribes certain
conduct, "it is impossible to conclude that all otherwise
prohibited conduct is permitted merely because it is directed at a
debtor's attorney."" Judge Fletcher added that the text of the
statute, exemplified by section 1692e, which prohibits false,
deceptive, or misleading representations, does not explicitly limit
its application to representations made to debtors directly. 78
Rather, the section's only limitation is that the communication
must be made "in connection with the collection of any debt."79
Additionally, Judge Fletcher insisted that it would be the
debtor, and not his attorney, who would suffer the consequences
of the majority's holding.so An attorney retained by a debtor and
aware of the majority's holding would be cautious, Fletcher
argued, whenever a communication from a debt collector was
received. The attorney would need to perform extensive
verifications of all representations made by the debt collector to
ensure that what was communicated was in fact the truth.
Accordingly, the cost of the attorney's time spent on verifications,
rather than on the debtor's actual needs, will ultimately be borne
by the debtor.8 2 Fletcher maintained that Congress intended the
FDCPA to serve as a remedial statute against debt collection
abuses, and burdening debtors with the cost of verifications
* Id. at 942 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("The majority's conclusion is inconsistent
with the purpose of the FDCPA. More to the point, its conclusion is inconsistent with
the plain statutory text.").
76 Id.
7 Id.
" Id. at 943.
79 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012).
80 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 945.
e1 Id.
82 Id.
I Id. at 942 (citing Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d
1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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would frustrate that purpose.8 ' He noted that the majority's
reading of the statute would promote the impression that once
"an attorney for the debtor enters the picture, the debt collector
is free to send false, deceptive, and misleading communications
to the debtor's attorney without fear of any damage judgment or
award of attorney's fees."8
Finally, Judge Fletcher criticized the majority's holding that
a violation did not occur when the debt collector sent a letter to
the debtor's attorney prior to verifying the disputed debt. 6
Fletcher conceded that "there may be some sense in allowing two
attorneys-one representing the debt collector and the other
representing the debtor-to enter into settlement negotiations
while a debt is still being verified."" But, he added, promoting
amicable settlement negotiations should not take precedence
over statutory language.88  Because, he argued, the statute
requires a debt collector to cease collection efforts in that interim
period, there can be no policy argument that overrules the
statutory text.89
B. Communication to a Debtor's Attorney Is Indirect
Communication to the Debtor Himself
The Third and Fourth Circuits adopted the opposite bright-
line approach, which declares that a debt collector's
communication with a debtor's attorney is indirect
communication with the debtor and is therefore actionable under
the Act.90
8 Id. at 945.
85 Id. Judge Fletcher added that although the Act's prohibition against false,
deceptive, and misleading representations should apply to communications sent by a
debt collector to a debtor's attorney, a different standard of review may be
appropriate. Id. at 946.
8 Id. at 947.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 947-48.
89 Id. at 948-49.
90 See Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2007);
Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
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1. The Fourth Circuit: Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson
In Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson," the defendants, Wolpoff
& Abramson ("W & A"), were attorneys retained by Discover
Bank to collect a debt owed by Sayyed.92 W & A sued Sayyed on
behalf of Discover in Maryland state court." Sayyed responded
by suing W & A in federal court, alleging that W & A violated the
FDCPA.9 4  Sayyed specifically argued that W & A's
interrogatories in the state action failed to state that they were a
communication from a debt collector attempting to collect a
debt,95 that the interrogatories contained a false representation,96
and that W & A's collection attempts were unfair or
unconscionable.97 Sayyed additionally claimed that W & A's
summary judgment motion in the state action contained a
misstatement as to the amount owed and a false representation
as to the percent of attorneys' fees, both violations of the Act." W
& A responded that both the interrogatories and the summary
judgment motion were served on Sayyed's attorney, not on
Sayyed himself, and therefore could not have violated the Act.99
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with W & A, holding that a
debt collector's communication directed toward a debtor's
attorney is not immunized from the Act's liability simply because
that communication was not sent directly to the debtor.o10 The
court first addressed W & A's claim that the Act does not apply to
communications made by attorneys in the course of debt
collection litigation.101 The court held that W & A was a "debt
91 485 F.3d 226.
9 Id. at 228.
9 Id.
94 Id.
" Id. (arguing that such conduct constitutes a violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)).
96 Id. (arguing that such conduct constitutes a violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)).
9 Id. at 228-29 (arguing that such conduct constitutes a violation of
15 U.S.C. § 1692f). Sayyed argued that the unfair or unconscionable collection
attempts occurred when three false statements were made: "(1) that the trial date
for the Maryland case was June 11, 2004; (2) that Sayyed had to state his grounds of
refusal to answer the interrogatories under oath; and (3) that the state court could
enter a default judgment against Sayyed if he did not mail answers to W & A within
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collector" as defined by the Act'02 and interpreted by the Supreme
Court. 0 3  The court relied on Heintz v. Jenkins'0 4 in which the
Supreme Court held that an attorney's actions in connection with
debt collection litigation were subject to the Act's provisions.0 s
The court also noted that after Heintz, Congress amended the
statute to remove the requirement that a debt collector notify a
recipient that a communication is made in an attempt to collect
debt only when that communication is a "formal pleading made
in connection with a legal action."0 e Therefore, the court
concluded, Congress's intent was for the courts to continue to
read the statute as the Supreme Court did in Heintz, applying
the Act's provision to communications made by attorneys in the
course of litigation, except as to the limited case of a formal
pleading. 107
The court then addressed W & A's argument that the Act
was not applicable in this case because the communication was
directed toward Sayyed's attorney, not Sayyed himself.'08 The
court looked to the text and structure of the Act and held that
"[a] communication to debtor's counsel, regarding a debt
collection lawsuit in which counsel is representing the debtor,
plainly qualifies as an indirect communication to the debtor."'09
102 Id. at 230.
103 See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that an attorney
who regularly engages in consumer debt litigation is a debt collector for purposes of
the Act).
104 514 U.S. 291.
105 Id. at 294. The Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether the
interrogatories fell under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)'s definition of "formal pleading"
because it had not been fully briefed by the parties. Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 235 n.2.
" Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231; see 15 U.S.C § 1692e(11) (2012).
107 Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231 ("Congress' amendment of § 1692e(11) provides clear
evidence that litigation activity is subject to the FDCPA, except to the limited extent
that Congress exempted formal pleadings from the requirements of that particular
subsection."). The court alternatively held that common law immunities are not
appropriate under the FDCPA because the Act provides a bona fide error defense,
which immunizes debt collectors if, by a preponderance of the evidence, they can
prove that the violation was unintentional. Id. at 231-32; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). The
court later held that this error provision may be a defense in this case, but that the
district court erred in finding that it was an alternative reason for dismissing the
case. Sayyed, 485 F.3d.at 235.
* Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232.
10 Id. The court supported that assertion by drawing attention to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Heintz. Although the issue in Heintz was whether an attorney
engaged in debt collection litigation constituted a "debt collector" for purposes of the
Act, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the case involved communications to a
debtor's attorney and not to the debtor herself. See id. at 235-36. Accordingly, the
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The court found that the Act's requirement that a debt collector
cease communication with the debtor once it learned that the
debtor hired an attorney demonstrates the Act's applicability to
communication sent to an attorney."o If a debt collector's actions
are regulated by the Act and the Act requires a debt collector to
communicate with the debtor's attorney, the Act should, the
court concluded, continue to regulate the debt collector's conduct,
regardless of whether the recipient of such communication was
the debtor or his attorney."'
2. The Third Circuit: Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.
In a similar Third Circuit case, Allen ex rel. Martin v.
LaSalle Bank, N.A.,112 the law firm of Fein, Such, Kahn &
Shepard, PC ("FSKS"), was retained by LaSalle Bank to bring a
foreclosure action against debtor Allen."' Upon Allen's
attorney's request, FSKS sent the attorney an itemized balance,
which included processing and attorneys' fees." 4 Allen claimed
that FSKS' attempt to collect fees beyond those amounts
expressed by agreement or permitted by law violated the Act." 5
The district court noted the circuit split and ultimately adopted
the Seventh Circuit's approach." 6  Because the court concluded
that a competent attorney would have recognized the overage
charges immediately, the court dismissed the case."'
Allen appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that "[a]
communication to a consumer's attorney is undoubtedly an
indirect communication to the consumer.""' The court supported
its position by focusing on the text of the statute. Like the
Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit found that "there is nothing in
court understood Heintz to mean that the Supreme Court impliedly held that "the
FDCPA covers communications to a debtor's attorney." Id. at 233.
" Id. at 233. The court added that "[aldopting the sweeping immunities urged
by [W & A] would stop the statute in its tracks." Id. at 236.
nI Id. at 232-33.
112 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
na Id. at 365.
1 Id. at 365-66.
"1 Id. at 366. Section 1692f provides that the attempt to collect an amount not
authorized by agreement or permitted by law is a violation of the Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) (2012).
n1 See infra Part III.C.
1 Allen, 629 F.3d at 366.
Id. at 368 (citing Evory v. RJIM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769,
773 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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the FDCPA that explicitly exempts communications to an
attorney.""1 Ultimately, the court remanded the case for further
proceeding to determine whether there was an agreement or
state law that permitted the collection of the amounts allegedly
owed in the communication sent to Allen's attorney.12 0
Essentially, both the Third and Fourth Circuits found that if
communications to a debtor's attorney are not covered by the Act,
debtors will relinquish all of the Act's protections as soon as an
attorney is hired-a notion that is never explicitly stated in the
statute.
C. Communication from a Debt Collector Unlikely To Mislead a
Competent Attorney Is Not Actionable: The Seventh Circuit's
Approach
In Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C.,121 Judge
Posner writing for the majority, refused to adopt either bright-
line approach.122  The Seventh Circuit held that when a debt
collector's representation "would be unlikely to deceive a
competent lawyer, even if he is not a specialist in consumer debt
law, [that representation] should not be actionable [under the
Act] ."123 The court consolidated four intertwined cases to answer
nine questions relating to the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.124 The court first addressed whether the Act's initial notice
requirements differed if a debtor obtained counsel.125 In one of
the consolidated cases, a debtor's attorney received a letter from
the debt collector that did not meet the statute's initial
communication requirements. 2 6 The court held that "[i]t would
be passing odd if the fact that a consumer was represented
excused the debt collector from having to convey to the consumer
the information to which the statute entitles him."127 Therefore-
n' Id. The court also added that "[ilf an otherwise improper communication
would escape FDCPA liability simply because that communication was directed to a
consumer's attorney, it would undermine the deterrent effect of strict liability." Id.
120 Id. at 369.
121 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007).
122 Id. at 774-75.
123 Id. at 775.
124 Id. at 771. Of those nine questions, three related to the application of the Act
to debt collectors' representations made to lawyers. Id. at 772. This Note will only
address those questions that are relevant to the general discussion.
125 Id. at 773.
126 Id. at 777.
127 Id. at 773.
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at least with respect to notice requirements-the court
determined that a debtor and his attorney are entitled to the
same information.'2 8 Like the Fourth Circuit's approach in
Sayyed,"9 the court supported its finding by highlighting the
Act's requirement that debt collectors, once given notice that the
debtor obtained counsel, cease all communications with the
debtor. 3 0
Further, the court looked to the definition of
"communication" under the Act, which is defined as "the
conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to
any person through any medium." 3 ' The court affirmed that
"[tihe lawyer is both 'any person' and 'any medium' "132 and held
that the debt collector was not discharged of its responsibilities
under the Act simply because the debtor hired an attorney.'3 3
After finding that a debt collector's required disclosures
under the Act did not change once an attorney was hired, the
court then addressed whether other violations of the Act were
also enforced as if they had been directed at the debtor. 3 4 With
regard to the Act's prohibition against the use of false,
misleading, or deceptive representations, the court held that "a
representation by a debt collector that would be unlikely to
deceive a competent lawyer, even if he is not a specialist in
consumer debt law, [would] not be actionable [under the
FDCPA].".113 In reaching its conclusion, the court expressed
concerns similar to those that the Ninth Circuit addressed in
Guerrero.36 The court recognized that an attorney would be less
susceptible to deceptive, harassing, or intimidating practices,
but, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the court stated that should be "an
argument not for immunizing practices forbidden by the
statute . .. but rather for recognizing that the standard for
128 Id. at 771.
129 See supra Part III.B.
13. Evory, 505 F.3d at 773; 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2012).
131 Evory, 505 F.3d at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)).
132 Id.
133 Id.
"' Id. ("The next question is whether debt collectors can, without liability,
threaten, make false representations to, or commit other abusive, deceptive, or
unconscionable acts against a consumer's lawyer, in violation of [the Act].").
136 Id. at 775.
136 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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determining whether particular conduct violates the statute is
different when the conduct is aimed at a lawyer than when it is
aimed at a consumer."13 7
In holding that a different standard should be used to
determine a debt collector's liability under the Act when certain
communications are directed at an attorney, the court asserted
that the analysis should differ depending on the type of
violation. 13  The court distinguished between false and deceptive
communications.3 When a representation by a debt collector to
a debtor's attorney is deceptive, as opposed to false, the court
acknowledged that the representation may be "unlikely to
deceive a competent lawyer, even if he is not a specialist in
consumer debt law."'40 Accordingly, the court held that a
factually true but nonetheless deceptive or misleading
representation that would not lead a competent attorney to be
misled or deceived should not be actionable under the Act.141
When a representation is false, on the other hand, an attorney
may be just as incapable of discovering the falsity as his client.'4 2
The court seemed to suggest that when an attorney's commercial
sophistication cannot provide adequate protection for the
debtor-when, for example, he cannot discover a falsity-the Act
should provide protection to the debtor where his attorney falls
short. Therefore, the court illustrated that a false claim such as
a "letter [that] misrepresents the unpaid balance of the
consumer's debt .. . would be actionable [under the Act] whether
made to the consumer directly, or indirectly through his
lawyer." 43
1' Evory, 505 F.3d at 774.
131 Id. at 774-75.
139 Id. at 775. Presumably, the court distinguished the terms by reasoning that
deceptive representations were factually accurate but, nonetheless, presented in a
way that would lead the receiver to be deceived. False representations, on the other
hand, the court assumed the statement to be factually incorrect.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. ("A false claim of fact in a dunning letter may be as difficult for a lawyer
to see through as a consumer.").
143 Id.
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III. How SHOULD COURTS DETERMINE IF A VIOLATION OF THE
FDCPA DIRECTED AT AN ATTORNEY Is ACTIONABLE?
Part A discusses why the three approaches taken by the
circuit courts do not adequately settle the issue, addressing each
approach individually. Part B proposes a solution and illustrates
its effectiveness using sections of the Act.
A. The Other Approaches Do Not Adequately Address the Issue
1. The Ninth Circuit's Approach
The Ninth Circuit's bright-line approach, which asserts that
"communications directed solely to a debtor's attorney are not
actionable under the Act," is overbroad and ignores the Act's
underlying purposes.14 The court's ruling was partially based on
the Act's multiple references to both a debtor and his attorney,
which, the court concluded, indicated Congress's intention to
treat the two differently."'s The Ninth Circuit insisted that
Congress made such a distinction because a sophisticated
attorney will protect his client from abusive debt collection
practices, whereas the Act will provide such protection to
unrepresented debtors.'4 6 That Congress distinguished a debtor
from his attorney, however, does not support the court's finding
that Congress intended to shield unscrupulous debt collectors
from liability simply because they communicated with the
debtor's attorney and not the debtor himself. In fact, this
acknowledgment suggests quite the opposite. Congress
recognized-and even accounted for-the very likely possibility
that a debtor may obtain representation for his debt collection
matters.'4 8 The Ninth Circuit failed to disclose how Congress's
foresight that debtors would hire attorneys necessarily means
that debtors' attorneys are not entitled to the Act's protections.
" Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2007).
145 Id. at 935. The court found that there appears to be a "congressional
understanding that, when it comes to debt collection matters, lawyers and their
debtor clients will be treated differently." Id. (citing U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)).
r4 Id. ("Congress did not view attorneys as susceptible to the abuses that
spurred the need for the legislation to begin with, and that Congress built that
differentiation into the statute itself.").
' It is a wholly unsupported assertion that Congress intended to shield a
debtor from the Act's protections simply because he hired an attorney.
14 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c(a)(2) (2012).
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As noted by Judge Fletcher in his Ninth Circuit dissent, the
structure and text of the Act do not support the majority's
position.149 As a textual matter, two early provisions of the
multi-part statute prohibit a debt collector from communicating
with any individual except the debtor's attorney with regard to
the debt.5 o The Act subsequently sets forth actions that would
constitute violations, including the use of harassment or abuse, 51
"false, deceptive, or misleading representation,"15 2 "unfair or
unconscionable means"1 in connection with the collection of a
debt. Therefore, Fletcher concluded, "it is impossible to conclude
that all otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted merely
because it is directed at a debtor's attorney."154 The impossibility
identified by Judge Fletcher is that if Congress meant to exclude
attorneys from the Act's protection, as suggested by the Ninth
Circuit majority, it would have explicitly done so. Instead,
Congress required a debt collector to communicate with a
debtor's attorney in their collection efforts and then prohibited
certain types of abusive debt collection practices, never limiting
those sections to apply merely to communications sent directly to
debtors.'15
Although protecting unsophisticated consumers was
arguably Congress's principal concern, there were other purposes
for the Act that the Ninth Circuit ignored by adopting its
approach. 5 6 Specifically, among the Act's enumerated purposes
is Congress's desire to generally "eliminate abusive debt
collection practices.""'5  The Ninth Circuit's bright-line rule
provides debt collectors seeking to engage in abusive behavior an
opportunity to do so without fear that their conduct will be
penalized. By removing communications directed at attorneys
14s Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 942 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
150 See supra Part II.B; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(6), 1692c(a)(2).
151 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
152 Id. § 1692e.
1- Id. § 1692f.
Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 942 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
s Under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f, which prohibit harassment or
abuse, false or misleading representations, and or unfair practices in connection
with the collection of any debt, respectively, the statutory text is not limited to
communications directed toward a debtor. In fact, these sections place the focus on
the debt collector and begin with "a debt collector may not," never mentioning the
individual receiving the representations. 15 U.S.C §§ 1692d-1692f.
156 See supra Part II.A.
157 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
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from the Act's coverage, there is no incentive-and perhaps even
a disincentive-to engage in amicable debt collection.' If a
debtor, for example, was willing and had the means to pay his
outstanding debt, he would presumably do so whether the debt
collector asked his attorney nicely or not. If, on the other hand, a
debtor did not intend or could not afford to pay his debt, he may
find a way-possibly by resorting to desperate means-to make
the payment after his attorney, who is being harassed, pressured
him to do so.
Another of the Act's purposes, "to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices
are not competitively disadvantaged,"" 9 would be frustrated as
well. Assuming that as a result of the Act debt collectors were
engaging in a less abusive and less manipulative collection
practices than before, that developed discipline would be
abandoned whenever a debt collector became aware that an
attorney had been hired.16 0 If the debt collector may engage in
behavior that is otherwise lawful but nonetheless harassing, a
debtor's attorney may have no legal recourse except to encourage
his client to repay the debt. Therefore, aside from promoting
conduct that the Act specifically seeks to eliminate, those debt
collectors who successfully harass attorneys to the point where
the attorney is pressuring his client to repay the debt will gain
an unfair competitive advantage over those debt collectors who
refrain from using such tactics.'6 '
The Ninth Circuit unintentionally strayed from its own
reasoning when it limited its holding to debtors who hire
attorneys and not to debtors who happen to be attorneys
themselves. The court's entire approach is grounded in the
understanding that "[ulnsophisticated consumers are easily
bullied and misled" while "[trained attorneys are not."62 But
15s Hoffman, supra note 12, at 559 ("[D]ebt collecting agencies often train their
employees that the only way to collect [from debtors not making payment] is through
the use of threats, harsh language, and mentions of impending legal action."). There
is, however, some evidence to suggest that debtors are less likely to repay debts
owed to debt collection agencies engaging in abusive behavior. Id.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
160 Congress's explicit acknowledgment of the potential unfair advantage that
could be gained by those debt collectors engaging in abusive practices indicates that
it was concerned-at least to some extent-that the unfair advantage was possible.
161 But see Hoffnan, supra note 12, at 559.
162 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisition LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the court qualified its holding to apply only to situations where
an attorney is hired by a debtor and distinguished that from a
case where the debtor is also an attorney.6 3  In that case, the
court said, "[a] debt collector is not insulated from liability under
the Act merely because a debtor also happens to be an
attorney."16 4 That qualification runs contrary to the circuit's
argument as a whole. If a "trained attorney"165 possesses such
sophistication so as to not need the Act's protections, there does
not seem to be a logical rationale for distinguishing between an
attorney who was hired by a debt collector and an attorney who
is the debtor. The majority seems to suggest either that a debtor
who is also an attorney loses his sophistication merely because
he is playing a dual role of debtor and attorney or that there is
more to the court's reasoning that did not appear in the opinion.
This logic gap may be the court conceding that there is more to
the Act than merely Congress's desire to protect unsophisticated
consumers.
2. The Third and Fourth Circuits' Approach
The Third and Fourth Circuits' bright-line approach, which
holds that a communication between a debt collector and a
debtor's attorney "plainly qualifies as an indirect communication
to the debtor"'66 and is therefore actionable, is overbroad and
captures conduct that Congress did not intend to capture.
Because the Act defines communications broadly to include
information sent "directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium,"6 7 that approach holds that any communication to a
debtor's attorney is by definition communication with the debtor
himself. 168
As an initial matter, and noted by the Ninth Circuit,
Congress undoubtedly intended for the Act to treat debtors and
their attorneys differently. 6  While that does not mean that the
Act never applies to communications sent to an attorney,170 as
16 Id. at 936 n.4.
164 Id.
165 The court specifically said that "[aittorneys possess exactly the degree of
sophistication and legal wherewithal that individual debtors do not." Id. at 939.
16 Sayyed v. Wolpoff& Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2007).
167 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2012).
168 Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232.
169 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935.
170 See supra Part IV.A.1.
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discussed above, it similarly does not mean the Act always
applies to such communications. If, for example, a debt collector
sent a debtor a letter that misled the debtor by claiming that
nonpayment will result in imprisonment, the debt collector would
be liable under the Act. If the letter was instead sent, pursuant
to statutory requirements, to the debtor's attorney, that same
representation may not mislead the attorney but would, under
this bright-line approach, lead to the same result.
It would seem contrary to Congress's intent to find that
letter, assuming it complied with the Act in all other respects,
violated the Act simply because it could have misled the debtor
had he been the one to receive it. The statutory text, which
prohibits "deceptive"'71 and "misleading"'7 2 representations, does
not support this view. Something that deceives or misleads one
individual may not produce that effect on another. Because a
violation occurs when, depending on the circuit, an
unsophisticated or "the least sophisticated" debtor173 would be
deceived or misled by a representation, the same standard should
not be employed for representations made to sophisticated
attorneys.174 Concluding that a representation is subject to the
Act's liability, regardless of whether it produced the effect
Congress intended to protect against, ignores one of Congress's
main concerns-the concern that the Act will curtail the debt
collection industry.7  That is because imposing liability on such
actions allows for the possibility that debtors and attorneys may
collaborate to take advantage of debt collectors who have
technically violated the Act but have not produced the
consequence that Congress sought to eliminate.17 6
1 15 U.S.C § 1692e.
172 Id.
173 Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act: A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 796 n.231 (2004-
2005).
114 As acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit, trained attorneys are less susceptible
to manipulation than ordinary consumers. See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935.
" See supra Part II.A. Congress intended to strike a fair balance between
providing adequate protection for consumers and not handicapping the legitimate
debt collection industry. See supra Part II.A.
176 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 561-62 (expressing concern for attorneys
who, on a contingency fee basis, find a technical violation of the statute and threaten
suit, causing debt collectors to settle).
1130 [Vol. 87:1107
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
3. The Seventh Circuit's Approach
Recognizing the limitations of both bright-line approaches,
the Seventh Circuit adopted a middle ground-but that too falls
short. The Seventh Circuit's approach can be broken down into
three parts. First, any notice requirement under the Act "must
contain the information that would be required by the Act if the
notice were sent to the consumer directly.""' Second, a
communication that would be considered deceptive or misleading
will not be actionable if it would not deceive or mislead a
competent lawyer.178 Finally, a false representation will be
actionable whether it was directed at the consumer or his
attorney. 179 While this approach may lead to the right result in
most cases, it is too difficult to apply.
The Seventh Circuit's approach addresses some of the
problems that arise with the two bright-line approaches. This
approach appropriately recognizes-as the Ninth Circuit
argued-the Act's presumption that an attorney and his client
are not one and the same.'s This difference, however, is
acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit's imposition of different
standards of review-at least with regards to deceptive or
misleading representations 8 1-rather than foreclosing a debtor's
action altogether, as the Ninth Circuit proposed.182 Additionally,
this approach, unlike that of the Ninth Circuit, does not
encourage abusive behavior because a debt collector's actions are
still subject to liability under the Act.'8 3 Further, this approach
does not pose a threat to the debt collection industry by imposing
liability for actions that do not lead to consequences that the Act
was meant to eradicate, as the Third and Fourth Circuits'
1' Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
17s Id. at 775.
179 Id. The court did not distinguish between a false representation of law and a
false representation of fact. While the example used by the court-a
misrepresentation of the outstanding balance-was a false statement of fact, the
court did not seem to limit its holding. Id.
'so Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir.
2007) ("A consumer and his attorney are not one and the same for purposes of the
Act.").
1I See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
182 See supra Part III.A.1.
3 See supra Part IV.A.1.
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approach does.1 84  That is because under this approach, for
something to qualify as misleading or deceptive, it must be
deceptive or misleading to a competent attorney.
Although the Seventh Circuit's approach provides for a
better solution than the two bright-line approaches, it does not
provide an easy framework for courts to apply. In its attempt to
impose a simple scheme, this approach provides courts with two
different standards of review and is unclear as to when each
would apply. On the one hand, when a debt collector sends a
debtor's attorney a required notice or communication that
contains a false representation, this approach directs the court to
apply the same standard of review it would as if the
communication had been sent to the debtor directly. 85 On the
other hand, however, when a debt collector sends an attorney
deceptive or misleading information, the court must determine
whether that information would deceive or mislead a competent
attorney. But the categorical distinction between a false,
misleading, and deceptive representation is unnecessary and
often very difficult to make, which may lead courts to apply the
wrong standard of review. A false representation that might be
obvious to a competent attorney but not to a debtor may, under
this approach, result in-much like the Third and Fourth
Circuits' approach-the imposition of liability where the debt
collector's intended result of the falsity-namely, for the debtor
to rely on the representation-never occurred. 8 6 If a competent
attorney, however, could easily discover the falsity, it seems
contrary to the remedial nature of the statute to impose liability.
This approach also does not account for Congress's intent
underlying the sections of the Act that require a debt collector to
convey certain information to a debtor. Instead of investigating
why the Act requires certain statements and disclosures be
included in communications between debt collectors and debtors,
this approach incorrectly presumes that all initial
communication requirements are necessary because the attorney
is simply a medium through which a debt collector must go in
"4 See supra Part IV.A.2.
'8 It remains unclear whether a false representation about the law that an
attorney would know to be false would qualify for this standard of review.
186 This is assuming, of course, that the false representation was intentional.
Had the false representation been unintentional, the debt collector would have an
affirmative defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012).
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order to contact the debtor.'87 Therefore, for example, if an
attorney receives a notice from a debt collector that fails to
include a statement disclosing that the letter is an attempt to
collect a debt, as required by the Act, this approach imposes
liability on the debt collector. This result is unfortunate because
an attorney would presumably be aware that the reason he is
receiving such communication on behalf of his client is because
the debt collector is attempting to collect an outstanding debt.
B. How Should Courts Determine Whether Communications by
a Debt Collector to a Debtor's Attorney Are Actionable Under
the FDCPA?
This subpart offers a simple two-step analysis for courts to
apply when determining whether communications from a debt
collector to a debtor's attorney are actionable under the Act.
When a court is faced with whether to impose the Act's liability
for communication directed at an attorney, two questions must
be answered: First, is the debtor's conduct of the type that
Congress intended the Act to regulate? And, if so, what standard
of review should the court employ for such conduct?
In order to answer the first question, the court must initially
establish that a violation of the Act in fact occurred. Only after
the court finds that the conduct would have resulted in liability
had the representation been made directly to the debtor, does the
court inquire as to whether it was the type of conduct that
Congress intended to regulate. To determine if Congress
intended to regulate the debt collector's conduct, the court must
participate in a section-by-section analysis of all sections that the
conduct would have violated had it been directed toward the
debtor. If the court concludes, based on its findings, that
Congress's intent would be served by imposing liability, then the
Act's "strict liability" 18 should be imposed. If, on the other hand,
the court concludes that a violation did not occur or that
imposing liability for a violation that was directed at the attorney
would not serve Congress's underlying intent, the statute's
liability should not be imposed.
1 Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; see, e.g., Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629
F.3d 364, 368 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) ("The characterization of the FDCPA as a strict
liability statute is generally accepted."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012).
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Determining Congress's underlying intent for the relevant
sections of the Act is not an easy task.' 9 Courts will be required
to look at what Congress's goals were for the individual sections.
If a section's purpose was to eliminate abusive conduct generally,
it would seem that by imposing liability on debt collectors who
engage in such conduct, regardless of whether it was the debtor
or his attorney on the receiving end, would serve that goal. But
if a section's purpose evinces Congress's intent to provide
protection to unsophisticated consumers, it would not serve that
intent to impose liability where the receiver was a trained
attorney rather than an unsophisticated debtor.
Once a court determines the Act applies to such
communications, the court must impose a standard of review to
determine whether the debt collector's conduct violates the Act.
The standard of review should be whether the debt collector's
communication would deceive or mislead a competent attorney
with the monetary resources of an ordinary consumer. If the
representation would deceive or mislead a competent attorney,
the court should enforce the Act as it would if a violation directed
at a debtor had occurred. If the representation would not
produce such effect on a competent attorney, the court should,
absent any other claim of unlawful behavior, dismiss the claim
against the debt collector.
This two-step analysis is one that can be implemented by the
courts with relative ease and remains committed to Congress's
intent. This approach considers-as the Ninth Circuit
articulated-the Act's inherent distinction between a debtor and
his attorney. 90 In the first inquiry, courts determine whether
Congress intended the violated subsection to apply to
communications directed toward a debtor's attorney rather than
the debtor himself, and in the second, courts will again
acknowledge the distinction when implementing a heightened
competent attorney standard of review. Therefore, unlike the
Ninth Circuit, this approach does not automatically bar a debtor
from bringing an action against the debt collector simply because
he acquired representation.
189 As exampled by Part II.A, Congress had many different reasons for enacting
the Act. A court would need to determine what the main purposes were for each
violated section.
'0 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisition LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Unlike the approach set out by the Third and Fourth
Circuits, this approach does not automatically extend the Act's
liability beyond Congress's intended reach. Whereas under the
Third and Fourth Circuits' approach a communication that would
mislead a debtor is actionable whether or not it produced that
effect on his attorney, this approach provides-more closely in
line with the Seventh Circuit-that a separate, heightened
standard of review shall apply for communications sent to
attorneys.
This approach attempts to maintain Congress's concern for
those debt collectors engaging in lawful debt collection. By
acknowledging that a debtor and his attorney should not be
treated in the same manner under the Act, debtors and their
attorneys could not use the Act to take advantage of every
technical violation to impose liability,'' the way the Third and
Fourth Circuits' approach allows. Instead, this approach
attempts to consider what Congress intended when it enacted
each individual provision and only applies those provisions to
communications directed at debtors' attorneys where it would
serve Congress's intent.
The second inquiry the court undertakes-whether a
violation occurred against a competent attorney with the
monetary resources of an ordinary consumer-accounts for the
difference in sophistication between an attorney and his client,
while providing a practical limitation on what a court can expect
of an attorney who will be limited by his client's resources.19 2
This examination, much like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,"'
acknowledges that Congress understood attorneys to be more
than just an indirect way of communicating with the debtor.
Congress recognized that an attorney with a higher level of
commercial sophistication will be able to provide some protection
against unscrupulous debt collectors to his client.19 4 The second
inquiry addresses the obvious shortcoming of the Seventh
191 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 561.
192 Although it is difficult to define the monetary resources of an ordinary
consumer, presumably a court would find a reasonable sum that an ordinary
consumer could afford to spend on such actions and apply that figure.
193 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935; see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
194 This reasoning is exampled in the Act itself. The Act, on more than one
occasion, requires that a debt collector only contact the debtor's attorney with regard
to the debt once it is made aware that one has been procured. See
15 U.S.C §§ 1692b(6), 1692c(a)(2) (2012); see also supra Part II.B.
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Circuit's approach, which imposes liability for false
representations of law or fact that were sent to an attorney but
were not relied upon.
As acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit and Judge Fletcher
in his Ninth Circuit dissent,' 5 the monetary resources of a debtor
are important and must be taken into account. Judge Fletcher
argued that the Act's purpose of protecting consumers is
circumvented if a prohibition against the use of false or
misleading representations does not per se apply to a collector's
communications with a debtor's attorney.196 The reasoning is as
follows: If attorneys are aware that a debt collector may send
misleading or false representation without subjecting itself to
FDCPA liability, the attorneys will be skeptical of any
information received from debt collectors. That skepticism will
result in attorneys charging their clients for the time taken to
verify each representation. It is worth noting, however, that this
is only true when a debtor is required to pay his attorney on an
hourly basis and loses his FDCPA case."' Because the debtor
would not be liable for the cost of the attorney's verification time
if his action is successful, it could be argued that the debtor is not
really harmed at all. But the mere possibility that a debtor will
bear the cost of the additional verification time is enough to
warrant section 1692e's application to such communications.
1. The Congressional Intent Analysis as Applied to Section
1692e: False and Misleading Representations
Section 1692e of the Act prohibits a debt collector's use of
"false, deceptive, or misleading representation [s].""198 Whether
section 1692e's prohibition applies to communications sent to a
debtor's attorney depends upon whether applying it to such
communications would serve Congress's intent. 9 The text of
section 1692e does not support the position that Congress meant
for this section to only apply to communications sent directly to a
debtor. As the Seventh Circuit argued, "[tihere is nothing in the
195 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 941 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Evory v. RJM
Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2007).
'e See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
197 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, if the court finds that a debt collector violated the
Act, the debt collector is responsible for reasonable attorneys' fees.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).
199 Id. § 1692e.
" Id. See generally Hearings, supra note 18.
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text of the FDCPA to indicate that attorneys representing
debtors are excluded from the class of third parties to whom a
debt collector may not make a false, deceptive or misleading
representation."2 00  The section's only condition is that the
prohibited representations must be made "in connection with the
collection of any debt."20 1 And, because under the statute a debt
collector is barred from communicating directly with the debtor
once the collector knows "or has reason to know" that counsel has
been acquired, the debt collector has no choice but to direct his
collection efforts towards the debtor's attorney once one has been
procured.20 2 Therefore, reading the statute as a whole, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to limit the section's application
to communications sent directly to debtors without
unambiguously stating as much.
Section 1692e's use of the terms "deceptive" and "misleading"
also support its application to communications sent to debtors'
attorneys. The term "misleading" is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as "calculated to lead astray or to lead into error. "203
Additionally, a "deceptive act" is one that is "likely to deceive [an
individual] acting reasonably under similar circumstances. "204
The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that "[ulnsophisticated
consumers are easily bullied and misled [and] [t]rained attorneys
are not."2 05 That an attorney may be less likely to be misled or
deceived by representations by a debt collector does not suggest
that Congress intended to insulate debt collectors from liability
whenever a representation was sent to an attorney. More likely,
Congress used the terms "deceptive" and "misleading" to focus on
the receiver of such representations, holding more sophisticated
individuals to a higher standard.2 06
A commercially savvy attorney is probably less likely to be
led into error than an unsophisticated consumer. Presumably
then, there will be cases where an attorney will receive a
representation that he did not find misleading or deceptive but
20 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 943 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
201 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
202 Id. §§ 1692b(6), 1692c(a)(2).
203 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (9th ed. 2009).
204 Id. at 466.
205 Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 935.
206 As discussed in Part II, Congress intended to strike a balance between
wanting to protect debtors against debt collection abuse and not wanting to harm
the legitimate debt collection industry. See supra Part II.A.
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that would have misled or deceived his client. In those
situations, the Act should not impose liability. If, for example, an
attorney received a letter from a debt collector that gives the
appearance that it is from an attorney's office, that letter may
not deceive an attorney but may have deceived his client. In that
case, Congress's intent would be frustrated, and not served, by
imposing liability on the debt collector. Instead, using the text of
the statute, a court should conclude that a deceptive or
misleading representation was not made and is therefore not
deserving of punishment. Imposing liability for such
representations may in fact frustrate one of Congress's main
goals when enacting the statute-namely, to strike a balance
between the interests of the debt collection industry and the
interests of consumers with outstanding debts.20 7
Additionally, as indicated by the Seventh Circuit, it is
important to distinguish between representations that are
deceptive or misleading and those that are false.2 08 The Seventh
Circuit held that an attorney might have as much difficulty as
his client discovering a false representation and therefore should
be treated the same way as a consumer under that approach.2
Although a court could find that Congress intended to eliminate
the conveyance of false information generally, it is more likely
that Congress intended to proscribe the conveyance of false
representations because of the effect-specifically, the
inducement of payment-those representations had on debtors.
As with deceptive or misleading representations, an attorney
may be in a better position than his client to discover an obvious
falsity. Therefore, instead of creating a presumption that section
1692e applies to all falsities made by debt collectors, this
approach allows a court to consider the type, manner, and
circumstances surrounding the false representation to determine
if it was of the kind that Congress meant to abolish.
207 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
208 Compare Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775 (7th
Cir. 2007) (recognizing that "[a] false claim of fact in a [communication] may be as
difficult for a lawyer to see through as a consumer"), with 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)
(2012) (stating that a false representation of "character, amount, or legal status of
any debt" constitutes a violation), and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4) (stating that a violation
occurs when a representation is made that nonpayment will lead to imprisonment,
garnishment, or attachment unless such representation is true).
20 Evory, 505 F.3d at 774-75.
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Legislative history supports the position that at least some
communications by debt collectors should be subject to section
1692e's prohibitions. Congress, in enacting this section,
specifically addressed the testimony of debt collectors using false
or misleading representations in an effort to collect the debts
owed.21 0 Congress heard testimony of a former debt collector who
stated that "[ilt was not unusual to hear a collector inform the
debtor that unless the bill was paid, they would be unable to
receive medical services at any hospital, or that they had better
nail their possessions to the floor before the law came and
removed everything they owned."21' Congress found that,
although such abusive behavior was not the norm, "the havoc
which they have caused in many people's lives, the amount of
humiliation, [was] great indeed."212 Therefore, based on various
deceptive tactics used by debt collectors in the past, Congress
included a non-exhaustive list of such actions that would be
considered violations of section 1692e.213 But Congress
emphasized that the general prohibition "enable [s] the courts,
where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is
not specifically addressed."2 14 Based upon the legislative history,
it would seem section 1692e has two main purposes: first, to
eliminate the abusive practices that were employed by debt
collectors and second, to protect individuals from such behavior.
By subjecting communications by debt collectors to section 1692e,
courts are not only protecting attorneys from being harassed
without any legal recourse but are also sending the general
message that abusive conduct will not be tolerated.
2. The Congressional Intent Analysis as Applied to Section
1692g: Validation of Debt
Section 1692g requires that a debt collector, within five days
of initial communication, provide written notification to the
debtor that must contain certain information specified in the
210 See generally Hearings, supra note 18.
211 Id. at 38 (statement of Patricia A. Miller).
212 Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr.).
213 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
214 S. REP No. 95-382, at 1698 (1977). This section is limited, however, to
representation or means only used "in connection with the collection of any debt."




section..2 " For the purposes of this discussion, this part will focus
on 1692g(b), which requires a debt collector to cease collection
efforts once a debtor has exercised his right to dispute the debt.216
As with section 1692e, section 1692g's applicability to
communications directed at an attorney depends upon the
congressional intent behind the section. As the Senate Report
indicates, Congress intended to "eliminate the recurring problem
of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to
collect debts which the consumer has already paid."2 17  The
validation notice, Congress found, was one way of remedying that
problem. Congress's concerns are not as compelling once an
attorney has been hired. Presumably, an attorney would perform
his due diligence and provide a recommendation to his client only
once he has established that the debt is in fact his client's and
that it has not already been paid.
A major criticism to this reasoning is that it assumes that an
attorney would have access to the information without a
validation notice. A court would need to engage in a detailed
factual inquiry to determine whether such information was
available to an attorney without the notice. If a court finds that
a competent attorney would be unable to obtain such information
without a validation notice, then the purposes behind Congress's
requiring such notice are not served, and liability should be
imposed for the debt collector's failure to provide the validation.
But if a competent attorney could obtain the information without
a validation notice, liability should not be imposed on the debt
collector.
215 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
216 Id. § 1692g(b).
217 S. REP No. 95-382, at 1699; see also Elwin Griffith, The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act-Reconciling the Interests of Consumers and Debt Collectors, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 29 (1999). There was great concern for those individuals who
were being targeted but never actually owed a debt. See Hearings, supra note 18, at
68-69 (statement of Karen Berger, Senior Attorney, Queens Legal Services
Corporation). Congress heard testimony of one individual who was called by a
woman purporting to be a nurse at a local hospital. Id. at 68. The individual was told
that his eight month old child had been hit by a car. Id. Before hanging up, the
nurse convinced him that she needed him to provide some important information.
Id. After racing to the hospital, the individual learned that his child was safely with
his wife at home and that the call was just a tactic used by a debt collector to obtain
information from the individual while he was in a state of shock. Id. at 68-69. The
most troubling part of this story? The individual did not owe the debt; the bank
where the debt was outstanding provided the wrong name to the debt collection
agency. Id. at 68.
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The Ninth Circuit suggested that the policy consideration of
"encourag[ing] the prompt and amicable settlement of debts"2 18
may weigh in favor of not imposing liability on a debt collector
who, after receiving a notice of disputed debt from the debtor,
communicates with the debtor's attorney prior to validating the
debt.2 1 9 The court noted that, while this policy does not override
provisions of the Act, it is an important consideration when the
statutory text is not clear.22 0 Where, as here, Congress's purpose
behind the section-to eliminate the problem of debtors paying
debts that they do not owe-is not as significant of a concern
when the representation is sent to the debtor's attorney;
promoting settlement discussions during the interim period
between a debt collector's receipt of a disputed debt and
providing validation would arguably serve Congress's overall
intent to find a balance between fair debt collection and
protecting consumers. Therefore, depending on the facts of the
case, after determining that the information that would have
been contained in the validation notice could have been collected
by the attorney from other sources, a court should consider the
policy of promoting settlement before imposing liability.
C. Application of the Congressional Intent Theory to the Mrs.
Goodman Example from the Introduction
Assuming that Mrs. Goodman's claims are that the debt
collector falsely represented the amount of her debt and
continued its collection efforts after receiving her notice that
disputed the debt, her claims implicate sections 1692e and 1692g,
respectively. Under the two-step inquiry, the first question a
court would ask is whether this conduct is of the kind that
Congress intended the Act to regulate. To answer that question,
the plaintiff must establish that such actions would have violated
the Act had they been directed at Mrs. Goodman herself. This is
easily done. Section 1692e explicitly prohibits a debt collector
from falsely representing the amount of a debt.22 1 Similarly,
section 1692g requires that a debt collector cease all collection
218 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis removed).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 939 n.9.
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).
2013] 1141
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
efforts upon receiving the consumer's writing that the debt is
being disputed. Both actions would be subject to the Act's
liability had they been directed toward Mrs. Goodman.
Whether these two underlying sections apply to the
communications directed at Mrs. Goodman's attorney requires a
congressional intent analysis of each violation individually. As to
the false representation of the amount of the debt, it is not clear
whether Mrs. Goodman's attorney is in a better position to
discover such falsity. It would serve Congress's intent to
eliminate the abusive practice of sending false representations
and promote fair debt collection to impose liability on this debt
collector's false claim of Mrs. Goodman's outstanding debt.
Once it is confirmed that the Act applies, the court would
then employ the heightened standard of review and determine
whether the false statement of the amount owed would lead a
competent attorney with the monetary resources of an ordinary
consumer to a result. Depending on the surrounding
circumstances, it is likely that a court would conclude that a
competent attorney would not discover the false representation
regarding Mrs. Goodman's outstanding balance. The only
information available to the attorney is Mrs. Goodman's belief
that the debt collector overstated the amount owed. Without
statements or records, her attorney is in no better position to
discover the falsity than Mrs. Goodman herself. Therefore, it is
likely that a court would impose the Act's liability for the debt
collector's misrepresentation.
As for the debt collector's continued collection efforts, the
court would need to engage in an important factual discovery. If
the collection efforts were the debt collector's attempt to engage
in settlement discussions with Mrs. Goodman's attorney and the
information that would have been in a validation notice was
readily available, the court may choose to not impose liability.2 22
If, however, the court determines that the debt collector's intent
was not to settle the debt or that the information is not readily
ascertainable to a competent attorney, liability would be
imposed.
22 See supra Part IV.B.2. There is a countervailing policy concern-namely, to
promote the amicable settlement of debts-for imposing liability on a debt collector's
technical violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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CONCLUSION
Determining whether communications between debt
collectors and debtors' attorneys should be actionable under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is a difficult task that has led
four circuits to adopt three different approaches. Those three
approaches, however, do not provide an easy framework for
courts to apply and do not adequately account for Congress's
intent behind the Act. The two-step analysis proposed by this
Note requires a court to first consider whether it would serve
Congress's underlying intent to regulate a debt collector's
violative conduct when it is directed toward a debtor's attorney.
And, if so, whether such violation, using the standard of a
competent attorney with the monetary resources of an ordinary
consumer, requires the court to impose liability. By adopting the
proposed two-step inquiry, courts will adequately account for
Congress's purposes behind the Act, using a standard that is easy
to implement.
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